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Executive Summary 
 
This paper looks at the planned austerity measures in Spain, the rationale for the spending cuts and 
tax increases, likely outcomes for future debt-to-GDP ratios, and the probable results of alternative 
policies. 
 
It is widely believed that Spain got into trouble because of the over-expansion of government 
spending. However, during the economic expansion from 2000-2007, the gross debt-to-GDP ratio 
declined sharply, from 59.3 to 36.2 percent of GDP. In 2009, interest payments on Spain’s debt 
were just 1.8 percent of GDP, a modest interest burden. Net debt had declined to 26.5 percent of 
GDP in 2007.  
 
Net debt is a better measure of the country’s debt burden than gross debt, because interest that is 
paid on debt held by the government accrues to the government, and therefore does not represent a 
burden on government finances. In this paper we will use both figures, because the gross debt 
figures are most commonly cited in the press. 
 
The cause of Spain’s current debt problems, as well as its unemployment and weak recovery, was 
thus not an over-expansion of government but the collapse of private demand. The country had 
built up a large housing bubble that began to collapse in 2007, at the same time that the economy 
was hit with external shocks from the world recession. Between 2000 and 2006, construction 
increased from 7.5 percent of GDP to a peak of 10.8 percent. Since the collapse, housing starts have 
fallen by more than 87 percent from their peak. 
 
Spain also suffered from the collapse of an enormous stock market bubble: the stock market peaked 
at 125 percent of GDP in November 2007 and dropped to 54 percent of GDP a year later. The 
wealth effect of this huge drop in stock values would be expected to be very large, in the range of a 
1.3 – 1.75 percent fall-off in GDP. 
 
Unemployment has risen from 8.5 percent to over 20 percent, and is projected to be at 15.5 percent 
at the end of 2013. 
 
For an alternative to current pro-cyclical policies, we consider two versions of a continued fiscal 
stimulus, amounting to 3.9 percent of GDP over the next two years, as compared to the baseline 
scenario. 
 
In the first alternative, the European Central Bank (ECB) buys debt equal to 4 percent of GDP 
annually over two years. This would be done with an agreement to refund the interest payments on 
the debt to the Spanish government. 
 
Although the ECB and European authorities – which currently includes the IMF for these decisions 
– would be unlikely to carry out this policy, it is important to illustrate because it shows that there is 
a simple, feasible alternative to present policies that does not lead to an unsustainable debt burden. 
In this case, the net debt-to-GDP ratio increases to just 60.5 percent of GDP in 2020, as compared 
to 64.3 percent of GDP in the baseline scenario based on the government’s projections. 
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The feasibility of such an approach must be emphasized. The U.S. Federal Reserve has added more 
than one trillion dollars to its balance sheet – thus more than doubling it – since the U.S. recession 
began. There has been no threat to inflation resulting from this money creation. The Bank of Japan 
has financed trillions of dollars of debt since the 1990s by creating money, with the result that there 
is a more than 100 percentage point (of GDP) difference between the government’s gross and net 
debt; and yet inflation has been extremely low in Japan over the past 20 years and sometimes 
negative. Consumer price inflation in Europe is currently at about one percent.  
 
In the second alternative, the continued stimulus is the same size but is financed through regular 
borrowing, rather than money creation by the ECB as described above. In this scenario the net debt 
is significantly higher, increasing to 68.3 percent of GDP by 2020. It is worth noting, however, that 
this is just four percentage points higher than the government’s baseline scenario. 
 
The government currently plans budget cuts and tax increases, which it projects will stabilize the 
gross debt-to-GDP ratio at 69 percent of GDP by 2013 (net debt at 62.4 percent). However, there 
are many historical examples in which growth turned out to be seriously overestimated when pro-
cyclical policies were implemented. For example, Ireland began reducing its fiscal deficit at the end 
of 2008. At the time, the IMF projected 1 percent growth for 2009; the actual result was negative 10 
percent. 
 
Furthermore, if the planned pro-cyclical policies result in slower growth or push the economy back 
into recession, this could cause the interest rate on new debt for Spain to rise. In this paper we look 
at three scenarios that incorporate a lower growth projection, with interest rates of 6, 7, and 8 
percent on Spain’s debt. In these scenarios, Spain’s gross debt-to-GDP ratio rises to 85.5, 90.6, and 
96.1 percent of GDP, respectively, by 2020. Net debt rises to 76.6, 81.7, and 87.2 percent of GDP, 
respectively. 
 
Thus, there are plausible scenarios under which the planned pro-cyclical policies can lead to much 
higher debt levels than would result from the continuation of a moderate fiscal stimulus. Even from 
the point of view of avoiding unsustainable debt accumulation, the risk of a prolonged stagnation – 
combined with higher interest rates – may be much greater than the risks associated with counter-
cyclical fiscal policy at present. And the alternative, feasible counter-cyclical policies would avoid 
much of the social and economic costs of lost output and prolonged high unemployment that Spain 
currently faces. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent months Spain has become a focus of sovereign debt troubles in Europe. The country’s 
borrowing costs, as well as the price of credit default swaps on its debt, have risen and its sovereign 
bond rating was downgraded one notch from AAA to AA+ by Fitch ratings. On June 30th, Moody’s 
warned that Spain’s sovereign debt was “on review for possible downgrade.”1 
 
In response to pressure from financial markets, and in order to qualify for assistance from the EU 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) should this become necessary, the government has adopted 
an austerity plan that provides for spending cuts of 15.3 billion euros, or about 1.4 percent of GDP, 
over the next two years. The government also plans tax increases of 17.9 billion euros, or about 1.6 
percent of GDP, for a total fiscal tightening of about 2.9 percent of GDP. It is also preparing to 
adopt labor market reforms that would make it easier to lay off employees and reduce severance 
packages.2 However, even among analysts normally sympathetic to fiscal tightening, it has been 
recognized that this will further slow an economy that is barely recovering from recession, with 
unemployment of more than 20 percent, as shown in Figure 1. In fact, the decision by Moody’s to 
review Spain’s sovereign debt rating was reported as “due to the weak growth prospects of its fragile 
economy.”3 This and numerous other press reports raise the question of whether the prescribed 
fiscal austerity could actually lead to higher interest rates on Spain’s debt, to the extent that these 
measures reduce economic growth. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Actual and Projected Unemployment, 2005-2013 
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Source: Eurostat and the Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda. 
Notes: This figure shows the national measure of unemployment.  The EU harmonized unemployment rate is 
currently somewhat lower, at 19.2 percent in the first quarter of 2010. 
                                                 
1  Agence France-Presse (2010a). 
2  Agence France-Presse (2010b). 
3  Agence France-Presse (2010a). 
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Most of the current discussion assumes that Spain must adopt policies of fiscal tightening and labor 
market reform in order to exit from the current crisis and to restore economic growth. It is assumed 
that the government cannot use expansionary fiscal policy, and that the ECB cannot help the 
country with expansionary monetary policy (in the form of quantitative easing). There is also a 
general perception that Spain’s problems are a result of excessive government spending and 
resultant growth of deficits and public debt. 
 
Furthermore, to the extent that the Euro is an overvalued currency for Spain – since its productivity 
levels are lower than Germany or France, and have fallen further behind in recent years – the 
current fiscal tightening offers the possibility of an “internal devaluation.” This is accomplished 
through lowering wages, as the economy shrinks due to pro-cyclical policies. Economic recovery 
based on internal devaluation has often proved to be difficult or impossible, for a number of 
reasons.4  
 
This paper looks at some of the details of Spain’s debt, the origins of the current situation, and 
projections under various possible scenarios. It will also compare the current pro-cyclical policies to 
various alternatives. The paper finds that the most commonly accepted analyses of Spain’s problems, 
as well as solutions, are questionable, and that feasible alternatives could be less risky and lead to 
higher levels of employment and output. 
 
 
Economic Context  
 
Table 1 shows the growth of Spain’s debt-to-GDP ratio, its central government budget balance, and 
GDP growth, since 2000. It shows robust economic growth (averaging 3.6 percent annually in real 
terms) from 2000-2007. During this time, the gross debt-to-GDP ratio declined sharply, from 59.3 
to 36.2 percent of GDP. The government’s budget balance shifted from small deficits to surpluses 
for the last three years of the expansion (2005-2007), with surpluses of about two percent of GDP 
in 2006 and 2007. It is also worth noting that interest payments on Spain’s debt were just 1.8 percent 
of GDP for 2009, a modest interest burden. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Spain: Selected Economic Indicators (Percent of GDP) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Gross Debt/GDP 59.3 55.5 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.2 39.7 53.2
Net Debt/GDP … … … … … 34.7 30.5 26.5 30.3 45.8
Interest Payments 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8
General Gov. Balance 
-1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.1 -11.2
General Gov. Primary Balance 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.8 3.7 3.5 -2.5 -9.4
Real GDP Growth (percent change) 5.1 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.6
Source: IMF (2010) and Eurostat 
 
 
                                                 
4  For a discussion of the difficulties of recovery through internal devaluation see e.g. Weisbrot and Ray (2010).  For a 
comprehensive account of downward nominal wage rigidity, see Dickey et al (2007).  
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Table 1 also shows Spain’s net debt, which declined to 26.5 percent of GDP in 2007. The net debt is 
a better measure of the country’s debt burden than gross debt, because interest that is paid on debt 
held by the government accrues to the government, and therefore does not represent a burden on 
government finances. In this paper we will use both figures, because the gross debt figures are most 
commonly cited in the press. 
 
These data – the sizeable decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio and the central government budget 
surpluses before 2008 – go against the common idea that Spain’s problems are a result of the over-
expansion of government. Rather, the country had built up a large housing bubble that began to 
collapse in 2007, at the same time that the economy was hit with external shocks from the world 
recession. Between 2000 and 2006, construction increased from 7.5 percent of GDP to a peak of 
10.8 percent.5 Housing starts have fallen by more than 87 percent from their peak.6 
 
In many ways this trajectory is very similar to what happened in the United States: the size of the 
real estate bubble in both countries guaranteed a recession when it inevitably burst.7 Like the United 
States in 2000-2002, Spain also suffered from the collapse of what appears to be an enormous stock 
market bubble: the stock market peaked at 125 percent of GDP in November 2007 and dropped to 
54 percent of GDP a year later. The wealth effect of this huge drop in stock values would be 
expected to be very large, in the range of 1.3 – 1.75 percent of GDP.8 
 
Thus Spain’s budget problems, as well as its unemployment and weak recovery, are the result of the 
same cause: a collapse of private demand. In such circumstances, the most efficient policy would be 
for the public sector to make up for the loss of private demand until private investment and 
consumption, and possibly net exports, can sustain normal growth. To cut government spending 
and raise taxes in such circumstances is pro-cyclical, and can be expected to weaken the recovery, or 
even possibly push the economy back into recession. 
 
It is worth noting that the amount of Spain’s government debt that has to be rolled over this year (as 
of June) is just 65 billion euros, and peaks at 78.8 billion euros in 2011; it falls off sharply thereafter. 
This is shown in Figure 2. In comparison to the $750 billion eurofund that the European 
authorities, together with the IMF, have set aside for financial support for Eurozone countries, the 
65 billion euros for this year is relatively small. This means that if the European authorities wanted 
to avoid the possibility of increased risk on Spain’s debt due to rising interest rates in the immediate 
future – as in the scenarios outlined below – they could easily do so with existing, already allocated 
resources. 
 
                                                 
5  Eurostat, National Accounts by 6 Branches. 
6  Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Estadísticas de la Construcción. 
7  See Baker (2009). 
8  This assumes a decline in consumption of 3-4 percent for the loss of stock market wealth, and takes into account that 
stocks in Spain were about 61.5 percent domestically owned during this period. 
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FIGURE 2 
Bills and Bonds Due, 2010-2041 (Billions of Euros)  
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Source: Banco de España 
Notes:  This graph shows how much of Spain’s public debt needs to be repaid or rolled over in each year. 
 
 
The Japan/US Solution: Central Bank Purchase of New 
Debt 
 
The most obvious solution is to maintain deficit spending at current levels, or possibly increase it in 
order to stimulate the economy. The argument against this strategy is that it may lead to 
unsustainable levels of debt. However, there is a way around this. What matters with regard to debt 
sustainability is the net interest burden of the debt. For example, Japan has a gross debt of about 
227.1 percent of GDP. But its net interest burden is less than two percent of GDP. This is partly 
because of low interest rates, but also because its net debt is far lower than the gross debt – about 
121.6 percent of GDP.9 In other words, over the years the Japanese Central Bank has purchased 
trillions of dollars of government debt, creating money in the process, thus preventing this 
borrowing and expansionary fiscal policy from creating a burden of additional interest payments.  
 
The United States Federal Reserve has also, during the recent recession, added more than one 
trillion dollars10 to its balance sheet. Most of this has gone to buying up mortgage-backed securities 
                                                 
9    See IMF (2010a).  
10  Congressional Budget Office (2010), p. 109. 
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from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and only a fraction was used to purchase new debt from the 
Treasury. However, it would have added no more risk of inflation or other adverse consequences if 
all of this money creation – more than 8 percent of US GDP – had been used to purchase Treasury 
bonds. U.S. inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index was negative in 2009 and is 
currently running at 2 percent over the past year. Japan’s consumer price index has risen just 5.1 
percent in total over the entire last 20 years, despite the monetization of trillions of dollars of debt. 
 
Spain’s core inflation was negative in April of this year and was barely positive in May; there is 
therefore more threat to the economy from deflation, which among other things would increase the 
country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, than there is from a rise in inflation. So a policy of central bank 
financing of new debt would make sense for Spain, as a way of pursuing counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
while not piling up a potentially unsustainable debt burden. The problem is that Spain does not have 
a central bank that could buy its debt through money creation, so this would have to be done by the 
European Central Bank. In such a scenario, the European Central Bank would buy some portion of 
new debt issued by the Spanish government, and commit to refunding the interest on that debt to 
the Spanish government – as has been the case with the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan 
in the financing described above. Thus the ECB would carry out the same policy that the Spanish 
central bank could do if Spain had its own currency, as the U.S. and Japanese central banks have 
done. This would be equivalent to increasing the gross but not the net debt burden, for the debt that 
was financed in this manner. 
 
The last two rows of Table 2 show what happens to Spain’s net debt if the European Central Bank 
were to purchase the country’s debt in the amount of 4 percent of Spain’s GDP, per year, over the 
next two years. It is assumed that the government does not raise taxes or cut spending during this 
time. This would allow for a fiscal stimulus of about 3.9 percent of GDP over two years, by 
abandoning the planned spending cuts and tax increases noted above. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Spain: Public Debt Projections Under Various Scenarios (percentage of GDP) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Gross 39.7 53.2 62.0 66.6 68.7 69.0 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 (a) Gov. Baseline 
Net 30.3 45.8 54.7 59.5 61.8 62.4 62.8 63.1 63.3 63.6 63.8 64.1 64.3 
Gross 39.7 53.2 62.6 68.5 72.3 74.4 75.7 76.6 77.2 77.4 77.3 76.9 76.4 (b) Low Growth 
Net 30.3 45.8 54.9 60.5 64.0 65.8 67.0 67.8 68.3 68.5 68.4 68.0 67.6 
Gross 39.7 53.2 62.7 69.1 73.5 76.3 78.5 80.4 81.9 83.2 84.2 84.9 85.5 (c) 6% Interest 
Net 30.3 45.8 55.0 61.0 65.2 67.7 69.8 71.5 73.0 74.2 75.2 75.9 76.6 
Gross 39.7 53.2 62.8 69.3 74.1 77.3 80.0 82.3 84.5 86.3 87.9 89.3 90.6 (d) 7% Interest 
Net 30.3 45.8 55.1 61.3 65.8 68.7 71.3 73.5 75.5 77.4 79.0 80.3 81.7 
Gross 39.7 53.2 62.9 69.6 74.7 78.3 81.5 84.4 87.1 89.6 91.9 94.0 96.1 (e) 8% Interest 
Net 30.3 45.8 55.1 61.6 66.4 69.8 72.8 75.6 78.2 80.7 83.0 85.1 87.2 
Gross 39.7 53.2 61.8 67.8 72.4 75.5 77.4 78.1 77.6 77.1 76.6 76.1 75.7 (f) Basic Stimulus 
Net 30.3 45.8 54.3 60.2 64.7 67.9 69.8 70.5 70.1 69.6 69.2 68.7 68.3 
Gross 39.7 53.2 61.8 67.8 72.4 75.5 77.4 78.1 77.6 77.1 76.6 76.1 75.7 (g) CB Purchase1 
Net 30.3 45.8 50.3 52.2 56.6 59.8 61.8 62.5 62.1 61.7 61.3 60.9 60.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: See Appendix for an explanation of the assumptions underlying each scenario. 
1In this scenario the European Central Bank purchases Spain’s government debt for two years.   
See the text for more details. 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the net debt-to-GDP ratio rises from 45.8 percent of GDP in 2009 to 
60.5 percent in 2020. This is a sustainable debt burden. For gross debt, it is an increase from 53.2 to 
75.7 percent of GDP. Even by this measure, this is not too high. The average for the European 
Union today is about 79 percent. (See also Figure 3.) 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Spain: Net Debt Projections Under Various Scenarios (percentage of GDP) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
This would be the most sensible alternative to the budget cuts and tax increases that are currently 
planned. It would enable the economy to continue the stimulus of 2009, and increase growth, 
without having to worry about significantly increasing the country’s net debt burden. 
 
It is worth noting that since unemployment is so high and expected to remain at very high levels for 
many years to come (see Figure 1 above), the government might want to adopt a larger public 
employment program to directly create jobs. This could be achieved by keeping the scheduled tax 
increases and expanding government spending on public works. The appropriate spending levels 
could be set, with the planned tax increases, to end up with the same debt-to-GDP ratios as above. 
 
Since Spain has adopted the Euro, it could not follow this strategy without help from the European 
authorities, including the European Central Bank. The ECB is currently working with the European 
Commission and the IMF to determine what policies will be required of Spain in order to get any 
assistance, if needed, from all three of these authorities. They all support the pro-cyclical, austerity 
policies that the Spanish government is committed to. 
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Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that there is a very feasible alternative that would 
immediately reduce unemployment and allow the Spanish economy to accelerate its recovery 
without posing the risk of an unsustainable debt burden. The risks to the European monetary 
system would be slight. The amount of Spanish debt that the ECB would need to purchase would 
be small relative to the Eurozone economy, less than 0.5 percent of Eurozone GDP. Eurozone 
inflation is currently at about 1 percent, well below the ECB’s target of 2 percent; and economists 
have raised questions as to whether 2 percent is itself too conservative of a target.11 The question of 
how the ECB could do this under its current rules, or whether these rules need to be amended, is a 
secondary one. The main point is that Spain can avoid both the current and planned economic 
losses due to pro-cyclical policy, and the risks of another recession, with the proper fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
 
 
The Risks of Increased Borrowing Costs and Slower 
Growth 
 
The first line of Table 2 shows the baseline scenario for Spain’s debt-to-GDP ratio as projected 
under the assumptions made by the government of Spain.12 This scenario includes the planned 
budget cuts and tax increases necessary to meet the budget deficit target of 3 percent of GDP in 
2013. In this scenario, Spain’s net debt rises from 45.8 percent of GDP in 2009 to 64.3 percent in 
2020. Gross debt rises from 53.2 percent of GDP in 2009 to 69.2 percent of GDP in 2020. This is 
not necessarily an unsustainably high level of debt, provided that interest rates are not too high. For 
example, Spain is currently paying an average of about 3.5 percent interest on its debt. At that rate, 
the interest burden with a net debt of 64.3 percent of GDP would be about 2.3 percent of GDP, 
which is modest. 
  
However, in a number of countries where pro-cyclical policies have been adopted, the economy has 
grown much more slowly – or shrunk at a faster rate – than anticipated. For example, in Latvia, the 
IMF in December of 2008 projected that the economy would decline by 5 percent in 2009;13 the 
actual result was negative 18 percent. In a less extreme case, Ireland began reducing its fiscal deficit 
at the end of 2008. At the time, the IMF projected 1 percent growth for 2009; the result was 
negative 10 percent. There are a number of other examples of overly optimistic projections made 
when pro-cyclical policies were adopted.14 There are also risks of early fiscal tightening as the 
economy recovers from a recession and shocks of the type that Spain has had, as has been noted 
with regard to the experience of Japan in the 1990s.15  
 
It is not surprising that economic growth would be worse than anticipated under pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. When these are adopted, governments are basically depending on positive 
                                                 
11  See Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010).  
12  See Appendix for more details. 
13  See IMF (2008a). 
14  For example, the IMF’s projections for Argentine growth during its recession of 1998-2002 were grossly 
overestimated.  See Rosnick and Weisbrot (2007). 
15  For a comparison of Spain’s recession and current situation with the Japanese experience of the 1990s, see Braun 
and Díaz-Gímenez (2010). 
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external shocks, such as an improvement in net exports, to pull the economy out of a slump. If this 
does not happen, a downward spiral is possible. 
 
In row (b) of Table 2, we consider a scenario in which growth is somewhat slower than projected 
for the baseline. The baseline projections assume real GDP growth of -0.3, 1.3, 2.5 percent for 2010-
2012, and 2.7 percent for 2013-2020. Our “lower growth” scenario assumes growth of -1.5, -1, -0.6, 
-0.3 percent for the years 2010-2013, with a linear convergence thereafter to 2.7 percent for 2020.16  
 
As seen in the table, the gross debt-to-GDP ratio rises to from 53.2 percent of GDP in 2009 to 76.4 
percent of GDP in 2020. Net debt rises from 45.8 percent of GDP to 67.6 percent of GDP.  
 
This is still not a terribly high level of debt, especially if we are using the net debt figure. However, 
there is a possibility that, as the economic recovery lags, bondholders would require a higher risk 
premium for Spanish government bonds. Figure 4 shows what happened in May when financial 
markets became worried about the possibility of default or restructuring in Greece and the other 
weaker Eurozone economies. As can be seen, the yield on 10-year bonds shot up to 12.4 percent for 
Greece and 6.29 percent for Portugal. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Yields on Benchmark 10-Year Government Bonds 
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Source: Bloomberg (2010) 
                                                 
16  See Appendix for more detail. 
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We therefore look at Spain’s projected debt under assumptions of higher interest rates: six, seven, 
and eight percent. As shown in rows (c) through (e) of Table 2, these higher interest rates, in 
combination with slower growth, have the potential to raise Spain’s net debt in 2020 to 76.6 percent, 
81.7 percent, and 87.2 percent of GDP respectively. For gross debt, the figures are 85.5, 90.6 and 
96.1 percent, respectively. 
 
There are many other possible outcomes. But the most important point that these projections 
illustrate is that one of the biggest risks to Spain’s solvency going forward is a combination of 
lagging growth – induced by pro-cyclical fiscal policy – and rising borrowing costs. The slow or 
negative growth and rising borrowing costs can feed off of each other and induce a vicious spiral. 
Therefore, although pro-cyclical policies are intended to reduce the country’s debt burden and the 
risk of future insolvency, they have the potential to end up doing the opposite. 
 
 
Stimulus Scenario 
 
Recognizing that the European authorities are very unlikely to use quantitative easing to support a 
fiscal stimulus in Spain – as in the first scenario presented in this paper – it is worth looking at the 
possibility of the government pursuing a fiscal stimulus of its own, borrowing as necessary on 
international financial markets. 
 
This is shown in row (f) of Table 2. In this scenario, the fiscal stimulus remains in place until 2011 
and is phased out gradually thereafter. Total government spending as a percent of GDP is one 
percent of GDP higher than in the baseline scenario in 2010, and 1.3 percent of GDP higher in 
2011. Tax revenue is also 1.7 percent of GDP lower over the two years, as tax increases planned in 
the baseline scenario are postponed. In this scenario, after 2011 the primary deficit is gradually 
reduced to 0.1 percent in 2016 and stays constant thereafter.17 Under this scenario Spain’s net debt 
rises from 45.8 percent of GDP in 2009 to 68.3 percent in 2020. As can be seen from the table, this 
is only four percentage points higher than the baseline scenario in which the budget deficit is 
reduced to three percent of GDP in 2013. It is also significantly lower than the scenarios involving 
slower growth combined with higher interest rates. Since this stimulus is financed by borrowing, the 
same relationship holds for the gross debt figures: in this scenario the gross debt rises from 53.2 
percent of GDP in 2009 to 75.7 percent in 2020. This compares to 69.2 percent of GDP in the 
baseline scenario, and 85.5, 90.6, and 96.1 percent of GDP in 2020 for the six, seven, and eight 
percent interest rate scenarios. 
 
Thus it is plausible, under reasonable assumptions about multipliers and government revenue 
elasticities,18 that the current austerity program would not result in a significantly lower debt-to-GDP 
ratio in 2020 than one which continued a stimulus over the next two years. And under scenarios in 
which the fiscal tightening results in some combination of lower growth and higher interest rates, 
the resulting debt/GDP ratio could be considerably higher than it is under a stimulus program. 
 
 
                                                 
17  See Appendix for more detail. 
18  See Appendix. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is generally accepted that the current fiscal austerity program in Spain will reduce growth and 
employment in the short run. However, it is argued that the planned fiscal tightening is necessary in 
order to prevent Spain’s debt from accelerating to unsustainable levels. 
 
This paper shows that there are plausible scenarios under which the planned pro-cyclical policies can 
lead to much higher debt levels than would result from the continuation of a moderate fiscal 
stimulus. Even from the point of view of avoiding unsustainable debt accumulation, the risk of a 
prolonged stagnation, combined with higher interest rates, may be much greater than the risks 
associated with counter-cyclical fiscal policy at present. And the counter-cyclical policies would 
avoid much of the social and economic costs of lost output and prolonged high unemployment that 
Spain currently faces. 
 
Furthermore, we argue that the very low inflation levels in Spain and the Eurozone would make it 
possible for the European Central Bank to finance counter-cyclical policy in Spain through the 
purchase of new debt, as has been done recently in the United States and for many years in Japan. 
This would allow for a rapid recovery without any additional net debt burden. 
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Appendix: Methodological Notes 
 
The debt projections in this paper distinguish between “old debt,” which is debt incurred prior to 
2010, and “new debt,” which is equal to the debt that is rolled over each year and additional debt 
incurred due to the primary deficit. This allows a more realistic analysis of the impacts of various 
interest rate scenarios since potential increases only affect newly contracted debt. Specifically, total 
debt to GDP, dt
T , is defined by the following three equations:  
 
 (1)   dtO = dt−1O 1+ itO( )/ 1+ gt( )[ ]− mt 1+ itO( ) 
 
 (2)   dtN = dt−1N 1+ itN( )/ 1+ gt( )[ ]+ mt 1+ itN( )− pt  
 
 (3)   dt
T
= dt
O + dt
N  
 
where dt
O  and dt
N  stand for old and new debt, as a percentage of GDP, at year t, it
O  and it
N  are the 
interest rates on old debt and new debt, respectively, mt  is the amount of old debt as a percentage of 
GDP that is maturing in each period t, gt  is the growth rate of GDP and pt is the primary balance 
as a percent of GDP. 
 
The stock of “old debt,” dt
O , decreases each year by the amount coming due, mt . At the same time, 
dt
O  is decreased by the nominal growth rate of GDP and increases with the interest rate on old debt. 
“New debt” increases each year by the amount that needs to be rolled over (mt ), the government’s 
primary deficit, and interest payments. Finally, total debt in each year is equal to the sum of old debt 
and new debt. 
 
Debt Scenario Assumptions 
What follows are brief descriptions of the assumptions underlying each debt scenario. 
 
Baseline Scenario 
In the baseline scenario (a) the government succeeds in meeting the budget targets outlined in its 
May austerity plan, shown in Table A1. The baseline also uses the government’s GDP growth 
forecasts for 2010-2013. Real GDP growth thereafter remains at 2.7 percent. This is the growth that 
the government projects for 2013; it is somewhat higher than the average over the last 20 years (2.47 
percent). 
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TABLE A1 
Baseline Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth -3.4 0.9 2.3 3.6 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 -0.3 1.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Budget Balance -11.2 -9.3 -6.0 -4.4 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 62.0 66.6 68.7 69.0 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.2 
Net Debt 45.8 54.7 59.5 61.8 62.4 62.8 63.1 63.3 63.6 63.8 64.1 64.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Lower Growth Scenarios 
The next four scenarios build on the baseline in assuming that the government successfully 
implements its austerity plan but as a consequence experiences lower growth. Instead of using the 
government’s GDP growth forecasts, this scenario assumes real GDP growth is -1.5 percent in 
2010, -1 in 2011, -0.6 in 2012 and -0.3 in 2013. After 2013 growth converges linearly to 2.7 percent 
by 2020.  
 
(a) Lower Growth 
The lower growth scenario (a) uses the lower growth figures discussed above. The interest rate is set 
at four percent for the entire debt stock. 
 
TABLE A2 
 Lower Growth Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth 
-3.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 62.6 68.5 72.3 74.4 75.7 76.6 77.2 77.4 77.3 76.9 76.4 
Net Debt 45.8 54.9 60.5 64.0 65.8 67.0 67.8 68.3 68.5 68.4 68.0 67.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
(b) Lower Growth: 6% Interest 
The six percent interest rate scenario (b) uses the same assumptions as in the previous scenario only 
it assumes that creditors demand a six percent interest rate in order to hold Spain’s public debt. In 
other words, the annual interest rate on new debt is six percent. The interest rate on old debt 
remains at four percent. 
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TABLE A3 
Six Percent Interest Rate Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth -3.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 62.7 69.1 73.5 76.3 78.5 80.4 81.9 83.2 84.2 84.9 85.5 
Net Debt 45.8 55.0 61.0 65.2 67.7 69.8 71.5 73.0 74.2 75.2 75.9 76.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
(c) Lower Growth: 7% Interest 
This scenario is the same as (a) and (b) only that it assumes an annual interest rate of seven percent 
on new debt. 
 
TABLE A4 
Seven Percent Interest Rate Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth 
-3.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 62.8 69.3 74.1 77.3 80.0 82.3 84.5 86.3 87.9 89.3 90.6 
Net Debt 45.8 55.1 61.3 65.8 68.7 71.3 73.5 75.5 77.4 79.0 80.3 81.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
(d) Lower Growth: 8% Interest 
This scenario is the same as (a) and (b) only that it assumes an annual interest rate of 8 percent on 
new debt. 
 
TABLE A5 
Eight Percent Interest Rate Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth 
-3.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 62.9 69.6 74.7 78.3 81.5 84.4 87.1 89.6 91.9 94.0 96.1 
Net Debt 45.8 55.1 61.6 66.4 69.8 72.8 75.6 78.2 80.7 83.0 85.1 87.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Stimulus Scenarios 
The following two scenarios consider what would happen if the government of Spain postponed 
fiscal tightening and instead kept the 2009 fiscal stimulus in place during 2010 and 2011. Specifically, 
total government expenditure remains constant at its 2009 level, 485 billion euros or 46.1 percent of 
2009 GDP. We also assume the government does not implement its currently planned tax increases, 
which amount to 17.9 billion euros over 2010 and 2011.  
 
(a) Basic Stimulus Scenario 
We consider the effects of these changes in government spending and taxation on GDP using a 
CEPR Alternatives to Fiscal Austerity in Spain   16 
 
 
spending multiplier of 1.2 and a multiplier of 0.4 for tax revenues, over a two-year horizon.19 As can 
be seen in Table A6, below, real GDP growth equals 1.1 percent in 2010 and 1.7 percent in 2011, 
and GDP surpasses its 2008 level by 2011. Real GDP growth then converges to its long-run rate of 
2.7 percent by 2014 and remains constant thereafter. 
 
Government revenue during 2010 and 2011 grows at the same rate as forecast by the government of 
Spain, but taking into account the effect of higher GDP growth. To do this we scale up government 
revenues assuming an income elasticity of revenue of 1.20 The result is a government primary deficit 
of 7.7 and 5.2 percent of GDP in 2010 and 2011, respectively. We assume the government gradually 
reduces its primary deficit in the following years. Specifically, the primary balance converges linearly 
to a 0.1 percent of GDP surplus by 2016. 
 
Interest rates in this scenario are the same as in the baseline—four percent for both old and new 
debt. 
 
TABLE A6 
Basic Stimulus Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth 
-3.4 2.3 2.7 3.6 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 1.1 1.7 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.7 -5.2 -4.3 -3.2 -2.1 -1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 61.8 67.8 72.4 75.5 77.4 78.1 77.6 77.1 76.6 76.1 75.7 
Net Debt 45.8 54.3 60.2 64.7 67.9 69.8 70.5 70.1 69.6 69.2 68.7 68.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
(b) Central Bank Debt Purchase Scenario 
This scenario uses all the same assumptions as the basic stimulus scenario discussed above. What is 
different is that in this case we assume European authorities purchase debt from the Spanish 
government in the amount of four percent of GDP in 2010 and 2011. In other words, the stock of 
net new debt in 2010 and 2011 is lower by four percent of GDP in both years. 
 
TABLE A7 
Central Bank Debt Purchase Scenario (percentage change and percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Nominal Growth 
-3.4 2.3 2.7 3.6 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Real Growth -3.6 1.1 1.7 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Primary Balance -9.4 -7.7 -5.2 -4.3 -3.2 -2.1 -1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gross Debt 53.2 61.8 67.8 72.4 75.5 77.4 78.1 77.6 77.1 76.6 76.1 75.7 
Net Debt 45.8 50.3 52.2 56.6 59.8 61.8 62.5 62.1 61.7 61.3 60.9 60.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19  Estimates by the OECD (2001) place the Euro Area multiplier at 1.2 over a one-year horizon.  IMF (2009) reviews 
this literature extensively and reports similar values for spending multipliers, and taxation multipliers in the range of 
0.4 to 0.5 over two-year horizons. 
20  This is a fairly conservative revenue elasticity for Spain.  IMF (1999) estimates that Spain’s overall elasticity of 
revenue with respect to GDP growth is 1.25.  Most Eurozone countries have revenue elasticities of about 1. 
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